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BUT THEY  DON'T WANT TO REDUCE  HOUSING  EQUITY 
ABSTRACT 
The majority of  the wealth  of most elderly  is in  the form  of housing 
equity.  It is often  claimed  that  many  elderly  would transfer wealth  from 
housing  to finance  current  consumption  expenditure,  were it not for the large 
transaction  costs associated  with changes  in housing  equity.  This is the 
rationale  for a market  in  reverse  annuity mortgages.  This  paper considers 
whether  transaction  costs, understood  to include  the psychic  costs  associated 
with leaving  friends,  family  surroundings,  and the like, prevent  the elderly 
from  making  choices  that  would improve their  financial  circumstances.  The 
analysis  considers  jointly  the probability  that an elderly family  will move 
and the housing  equity  that is chosen  when a move occurs.  The results  are 
based  on the decisions  of  the Retirement  History  Survey  sample between  1969 
and 1919.  Relative  to the potential  gains  from a reallocation  of wealth 
between  housing  equity  and other  assets,  transaction  costs  are very large. 
Nonetheless,  the effect  on  the housing  equity  of  the elderly  is very small. 
On  balance,  were all elderly  to move and choose  optimum  levels of housing 
equity,  the amount  of housing  equity  would  be increased  slightly.  Most 
elderly  are not liquidity  constrained.  And contrary  to standard  formulations 
of  the life cycle hypothesis,  the typical elderly  family  has no desire to 
reduce housing  equity.  The desired  reduction  of housing  equity  is largest 
among  families with low income  and  high housing  wealth,  but even in this case 
the desired  reductions  are rather  small.  And these  desired reductions  are 
more than  offset  by the desired  increases  of other  families,  especially  those 
with  high income and low  housing  wealth.  Thus,  consistent  with the previous 
findings  of  Venti  and  Wise and of Feinstein  and McFadden,  limited  demand  may 
explain  the absence  of a market  for reverse annuity mortgages. 
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The majority  of the wealth  of most elderly  is in the  form  of housing 
equity.  This housing  wealth,  it is claimed,  is a potential source  of support 
for the elderly  as they age.  It is further  claimed  that many elderly  would 
choose  to transfer  wealth from  housing  to finance  current consumption 
expenditure,  were it not for the large transaction  costs associated  with 
changes  in housing  equity.  In the past,  it has typically  been necessary  for 
such families  to move to withdraw  wealth  from  housing.  Indeed,  the rational 
for a market in reverse  annuity  mortgages  has been that the elderly  would like 
to withdraw  wealth from  housing were it possible  to do so without  incurring 
the  large  transaction  costs  associated  with  moving.  This paper considers 
whether  these  claims  are correct.  Two related  questions  are addressed: 
•  Given the predetermined  financial  and other  circumstances  of families 
as they approach  retirement  ages,  would  the typical elderly family  like 
to withdraw  wealth from  housing? 
•  Are the transaction  costs  of moving  large,  and do they constrain 
adjustments  in the housing wealth  of the elderly  as they age? 
The paper  provides a clear  answer  to  the first  question.  Jere all 
elderly  to choose  optimal  housing  equity,  given  their  existing  circumstances, 
there would  be little  change  in housing  wealth  on average.  In  particular,  the 
typical elderly family  would  not choose  to reduce housing  equity.  The answer 
*We wish to thank  Alan Auerbach  for his comments  as the disucssanc,  some 
of which are now incorporated  in the paper. (2) 
- 
to  the second  question  is less evident.  Assuming that the elderly could  gain 
from  a reallocation  of wealth  between  housing equity  and other assets,  the 
relative gain,  in these tens, necessary  to justify moving  is typically  very 
large.  Our evidence  suggests  a strong  preference  for remaining  in existing 
housing as the  elderly  grow older.  On the other  hand,  that the housing equity 
of the elderly is not typically  reduced  as they  age is not explained  by the 
high transaction  costs of  moving.  The elderly like it that  way. 
In a predecessor  to this  paper [1987]  ,  we  considered  the change in 
housing equity  when the elderly move.  The primary conclusion  of that analysis 
was that the elderly  who move  were about  as likely  to increase  as to decrease 
housing  equity.  But,  families  with low income  relative  to housing  wealth  were 
more likely  to move and to reduce  housing  equity  when they  did.  The latter 
finding raises  the possibility  that transaction  costs  constrained  the choices 
of some elderly  who otherwise  would  have chosen  to transfer  wealth  out of 
housing.1 
The current  paper is a more fonal treatment  of moving  and the choice  of 
housing  equity;  the two are considered  jointly.  The method is analogous  to 
the approach  set forth in  Venti and  Wise [1984] and used to analyze the 
housing  choices of low income  renters.  The current  paper considers  the 
allocation  of bequeathable  wealth  between  housing and other  assets, 
conditional  on their  predetenined levels  and on the income  and other 
circumstances  of the elderly  as they age.  There  are two key features  of the 
1The findings  of the predecessor  paper were very similar  to those  of 
Feinstein  and McFadden [1988]  ,  based on the Panel Survey  of Income  Dynamics; 
our findings  were based  on the Retirement  History  Survey.  These  findings  are 
also  consistent  with the results  reported  earlier by Merrill [1984] (3) 
model:  one  is that an elderly  family  moves if the gain from changing  housing 
outweighs  the  transaction  costs  of moving.  Transaction  costs  are understood 
to include,  and are likely  to be dominated  by,  the psychic costs associated 
with leaving  friends,  familiar  surroundings,  and the like.  The other is that 
the housing equity  chosen  after  a move represents  the optimal  level  of housing 
equity,  given  current  circumstances.  Based  on the second  assumption,  the 
model is used to simulate  the changes  in  housing equity  that the elderly  would 
choose to make,  were they to overcome  the transaction  costs  of moving  and 
choose  optimal  levels of housing  equity.  The analysis  is based on the 
Retirement  History Survey (RHS)  Families  are followed  over the six RHS 
surveys,  conducted  every two years  between  1969 and 1979. 
The model is described  in the first section.  Parameter  estimates  are 
discussed  in section  two and the results  of simulations  are reported  in the 
third  section.  Section  four contains  concluding  remarks. 
I.  The ModeL 
The goal of the analysis is to estimate  the housing equity  that the 
elderly  would  prefer.  With this goal  in  mind,  we consider the allocation  of 
bequeathable  wealth  between  housing  and other assets,  conditional, on current 
income and other  circumstances.  Suppose  that the value of housing equity 
versus  other  wealth  can be captured  by the simple  function 
(l,)  V  - 
where  H  is housing  equity, W is total bequeathable  wealth,  and $ is  a 
preference  parameter  depending  on income and other  individual  characteristics. 
Then preferred  housing equity  is (4) 
(2)  H—$W 
In fact,  the precise functional  form  of (2), described  below, was chosen  to 
fit housing equity  choices.  Equation (1) was then  chosen  to be consistent 
with these  empirically  observable  outcomes.2  It essentially  serves  to compare 
existing  housing equity  with the preferred  level  and as a device  to assure 
consistent  treatment  of moving  and housing equity  choices. 
The family  moves  between  two survey  periods if 
(3)  >1, 
V0'M 
where V  is the value of the optimal  allocation  of  wealth,  V0 is the value of 
the allocation  at the beginning  of the period,  and  14 indicates  the preference 
for current  housing, presumably  with a  value greater than  one.  It reflects 
the transaction  costs  that  must  be overcome  if the family  is to move.  If the 
gain from moving  is  C, the family  will move if 
(4)  G—lnV-  lnV0 -lnM>0 
The transaction  costs  parameter 14 reflects  everything  that gives an 
advantage  to current  housing,  after  controlling  for the equity  value of 
housing and the wealth  allocation  that  it represents.3  For example,  the value 
2More "structural"  specifications  based on the. asset  value and the 
consumption  value of housing,  and on a  budget constraint  limiting  the user 
coat  of housing to current  income, were rejected  in favor  of this simple 
specification. 
3In this sense,  the model is consistent  with  models  explicitly 
incorporating  both consumption  and investment  demands  for housing,  as in 
Henderson  and loannides  [1983,  1987]  ,  for  example. (5) 
function in equation (1) could  have been  written with an additional 
multiplicative  term E', where E represents  attributes  that accompany  housing, 
in addition to its equity  value.  Then AlnV  would include  a term a(lnE 
- 
mE0),  which would  be part of what lnl4 is presumed to capture. 
Transaction  costs M  are parameterized  as 
(5)  1n14 —  + m(X)  +  e 
where 
in0 is  a constant  term,  m(X)  is a function  of individual  characteristics 
like change in  marital status  or retirement,  and e is a random  term.  The 
random  term is assumed  to have the variance  components  form 
2  2 
(6)  e. 
— A.  +  Eit  var(A)  — 
aA  var(€)  — a, 
where  A1 reflects  variation  among individuals  in resistance  to or preference 
for moving.  It is clear  that families  could  move for many reasons  other than 
to change  housing equity  and that the value of the house to the family 
reflects  much more than its asset  value.  It is also  clear that  many family 
attributes  that  may determine  moving  decisions  are not included  explicitly  in 
our analysis.4 Thus the  individual-specific  term  A,  that is assumed to 
persist  over time.  The Eft component  is assumed  to be random  across  survey 
intervals  and to be uncorrelated  with A.  For  any family,  it captures  the 
effect  of changes  in unmeasured  variables  from  interval  to interval.  As will 
become  clear  below,  it may also reflect  the effect  of the difference  between 
41n their  work,  Feinstein  and McFadden  strongly  reject  the null 
hypothesis  of no unobserved  household  effects  on mobility  decisions. (6) 
actual  alternative  housing  possibilities  that exist in  fact,  and the optimal 
choice  that is assumed to exist. 
If 6 has  a normal  distribution  with  mean zero,  the probability  that the 
family  will move between  any two survey  periods,  conditional  on  A,  is 
(7)  Pr{Move]  — Pr[E  < tslnV 
- 
m0 
-  m(X) 




-  m(X) 
- A)/a] 
where tlnV  — lnV 
-  lnV0 and  is the cumulative  normal  distribution  function. 
The term  tslnV  is a measure of disequilibrium;  it is large if the optimal 
allocation  of wealth  between  housing and other  assets  is very different  from 
the existing  allocation.  The optimal  allocation,  however,  is likely  to vary 
among families.  To capture potential  differences  among  families  in preferences 
for housing  equity,  fi  is  parameterized  as 
(8)  — -l  + d(Z)  + t',  E(v)  — 0,  var(v)  — 
That  is,  fi  is  assumed  to follow  a random  walk with drift  d(Z),  where 
(9)  d(Z) — 
d0  + 
d1A 
+ d2A2 + d3Y + d4W  + d5Y.W 
Here,  the terms  in age A capture the effect  of age on the drift,  reflecting 
the possibility  that  preferences  change with age.  The terms  in income  Y  are 
to recognize  that  the amount  of total  wealth  that  the family  prefers to have 
in housing equity  is likely  to depend  on current  tncome, which along  with  non- 
housing  bequeathable  wealth can be used to finance  current  consumption.  The 
disturbance  i.' reflects random  changes  in preferences  not captured  by measured 
variables. 
The allocation  of wealth  at the beginning  of the period is taken  as a 
base indication  of preferences,  and optimal  choices  are considered  relative to (7) 
that base.  In period  t-l, we observe  Ntl and 1l  we set t-l 
— Nt  i/vt 
Desired  housing in period t is then given by an estimate  based on the 
proportion  of total  wealth  allocated  to housing in period  t-l, plus a 
deviation  from that estimate.  As the family  ages,  there may be an 
tncreasingly  large  difference  between Nt i/Vt 1 and desired  the extent  of 
disequilibrium  may increase.  The term d(Z)  reflects  this  possibility.  In 
effect,  the housing demand  equation  predicts  desired  changes  in  housing 
equity.  Based on equations (8)-(9) and the definitions  above,  it is given  by 
Ht* (Nt  /Wti)Wt  + (d(Z))t + vW 
The information  to estimate  this equation  comes  primarily  from the changes in 
housing equity for families  who move during  the survey  period.  In  essence, 
the model estimates  the preferred  change  in housing  equity  as a function  of 
age, current  income,  and current  total wealth.5 
The random  term v may be interpreted  in  two "ays:  one is as a 
maximization  error,  reflecting  for example  an inability  to find a house with 
precisely  the optimal value.  The other  is as a further indication  of 
heterogeneity  among families,  reflecting  desired  housing  choices.  The 
implications  of both interpretations  are considered  below. 
tIt is clear  from equation  (10) that the specification  may be interpreted 
as a disequilibrium  model, where d(Z)  represents  the extent  of disequilibrium 
in the proportion  of wealth allocated  to housing.  An alternative  procedure is 
to predict desired  housing wealth  directly  as a function  of  age,  current 
income,  and total wealth,  without incorporating  the  term  Ni/Wi. The use 
of the predetermined  ratio  is a way to control  directly  for Seterogeneity; 
otherwise  it would be concentrated  to a greater  extent  in the disturbance 
term.  Because the estimation  procedure  does not integrate  over  possible 
values of desired  housing  equity,  given the right-hand  variables  in equation 
(10), more accurate  predictions  can be had by using the procedure  that is 
followed  here. (8) 
The data consist  of five surveys conducted  at 2-year  intervals.  There 
are two possible  outcomes for each  family:  1.  The family  does  not move 
during  the entire  10-year survey  period.  2.  The family  moves in period  r and 
chooses  a level  of housing equity  H1.  The probability  of the first  outcome  is 
given  by 
(11)  Pr[Don't  move]  — 
where $ is defined in equation  (7),  the subscripts  indicate  intervals  between 
successive  surveys,  and f(A)  is the density  of A.  The probability  of the 
second  outcome  is given  by 
(12)  Pr[Move  between  r-l and  r,  and spend  H1] 
— ISAU1-tl] 
. . [l-11]1)f(A)dA).g(H1) 
where g(H1)  is the density  of desired housing equity  in  period r.  Given the 
family-specific  term A, the probability  of moving  during  the ten-year  period 
of the RHS  is given  by the product of univariate  normal  probabilities,  each 
representing  the mobility  decision  for a two-year  interval.  Integrating  over 
possible  values  of Ai is accomplished  by Gaussian  quadrature.6  In calculating 
the probability  that the family  moves,  the terms lnV* and lnVo  must be 
evaluated.  The first  term represents  the value  of the optimal  wealth 
allocation  and is given  by lnV* 
— $tthH*t  + (l-$)ln(W-H*), where 
H*t 
—  The second  term  is the value  of the wealth  allocation  inherited 
6See Butler  and Moffit [1982] for more explanation  in the context  of a 
different  application. (9) 
from the previous  period and is given  by lnVo 
— fit1t-l + (l$t)ln(Wt-Hti).' 
In  suiurnary:  Families  are followed  until  they  move (or until 1979 when 
the RBS panel survey  ended).  It is assumed  that the optimal level  of housing 
equity  H*t is chosen  when the family  moves,  up to an error component 
represented  by u.  The family  moves if the gain  from  moving outweighs  the 
transaction  costs  of moving.  The predicted  level  of H*t is used to determine 
the value of preferred  housing  equity in period  t; the value of current 
housing equity  is determined  by the level  of housing equity  at the beginning 
of the interval,  V0  Heterogeneity  in resistance  to  moving,  or in 
attachment  to current  housing, is represented  by a random  term with a variance 
components  decomposition.  The family-specific  component A  is assumed  to be 
the same,  for a given  family,  over the period  of the analysis.  The time- 





-  m(X)  >  +  The disturbance  terms  u, 
and are assumed to be mutually  uncorrelated. 
II.  Parameter  Estimates 
Estimates  are based on data  from the Retirement  History Survey (RI(S). 
The survey  covered  families  headed  by persons  age 58 to 63 in 1969.  The 
7In principle,  both probabilities  might involve  integration  over possible 
values of  H*7,  since  not all families  have the same preferences  and even if 
they did,  the optimal housing  level  may not  be available  at any point in time. 
Integration  would  be over the random  term  xi,  when V, is evaluated.  This is 
the procedure  followed  in  Venti  and Wise [1984]  .  It is not done  here for two 
reasons.  It adds substantial  complexity  to the likelihood  calculations.  And, 
the method  used to predict desired  Ht already  incorporates  substantial 
heterogeneity  in housing  preferences;  the remaining  residual  variance is 
small. (10) 
fsmilies  were interviewed  every  two years between 1969 and 1979;  there were 
six waves altogether.  The final  sample is comprised  of 3423 families,  Of 
these, 24 percent  moved during  the 1969-1979  period.  Selection  of the 
estimation  sample is explained  in an appendix.  Estimates  of the parameters  in 
the model are shown  in table  1.  The estimated  housing equity  function  is 
discussed  first,  then the probability  of  moving. 
A.  Rousium Equity 
The disturbance  term in the housing  equity function  is heteroskedastic, 
with the specification  aW.  The estimated  a1,  is 0.2008;  the mean of W is 
$74,465.  Thus,  given the ratio  of housing  wealth to total  wealth in  the last 
period,  current  income,  current  wealth,  and age,  the standard  deviation  of the 
desired change  in housing equity  is $14,953,  evaluated  at the mean of  wealth. 
The mean difference  between  desired  and actual  equity is small,  however,  about 
$1010, estimated  over the whole sample.  This  means that  on average  the gain 
to be had by a reallocation  of wealth  between housing and other  assets is 
small.  The mean of the estimated  values  of lnV  is only .041,  indicating 
thatthe  average  potential  gain,  in utility  terms,  from  a reallocation  of 
wealth  is only about  4 percent.  It is substantially  larger  than  that for  some 
families,  however.  The standard  deviation  of the estimated  dlnv is  .115. 
The mean of the estimated  values  of  $, the desired  proportion  of wealth 
in housing  equity,  is .53.  The mean  of the estimated  values  of d, the 
difference  between  the cunent  and the desired  proportions  is  .0107.  Thus,  on 
average,  the desired  proportion  of wealth  in housing equity  is very close to 
the existing  proportion. 
There  is essentially  no effect  of age on desired  housing  equity.  ?s the 
typical  family  ages one year,  the desired  proportion  of wealth  in housing is (11) 
Table 1.  Parameter estimates. 
Parameter  Standard 
Estimate  Error 
Housing Equity: 




Age squared (/100) 
Income 
Wealth 




Transaction Costs,  lnM: 
Constant, m0 
Retirement Status 
No  ->  No 
Yes  ->  No 
No  ->  Yes 
Yes  ->  Yes 
Family Status 
Single ->  Single 














Number of observations: 
0.  2008 
-2.  6855 
0.  0859 
-0.  0682 
0.0015 





-0.  3034 
-0.3810 
-0.  2700 
-0.2846 
-0.  5626 
-0.1728 













0.  0826 




0.  0558 









Means and Standard deviations [.] of estimated values: 
-3391.0 
3423 (12) 
reduced  by -.0014:  .0859  -  2C000682)Age, evaluated  at the mean age of 64. 
The housing  equity function  fits the observed  choices  of movers  very well,  as 
shown in figure  1.  The estimated  values of  fl--the  desired  proportion  of total 
wealth in housing  equity,  and the observed  choices  H + W,  are  graphed  against 
total wealth  percentile for movers.  No systematic  deviation  of predicted  from 
actual  values is revealed. 
B.  Movinz 
Recall that  the transaction  costs parameter  M reflects  everything  that 
gives  an advantage  to current  housing,  after  controlling  for the equity  value 
of housing and the wealth allocation  that it  represents. 
It is informative  first  to report  the results  from  a two-stage  estimation 
procedure:  the housing  equity  equation  (11) is estimated  by non-linear  least 
squares  in the first  stage,  using  data  for movers  only.  The prediction  of 
desired  housing equity  fro2 the first stage  is used to calculate  A1nV.  A 
simple probit  equation  with lnV  and  other  variables  that are assumed  to 
determine  the probability  of moving  is estimated  in  the second  stage.  The 
relevant  probabilities  are of the farm  Pr{Move)  — Pr[e < lnV  -  lnM]  where 
here  e represents  both the individual-specific  and the period  specific  random 
components  of  moving,  e — A  + €.  The  larger  lnV, the greater  the probability 
of  moving,  as expected.8 But lnV explains  only a small part of moving 
behavior.  With no change  in  retirement,  marital,  or health  status,  the 
transaction  costs  parameter  lnM, which is the constant  term  in the probit 
equation,  is large,  say on the order  of 1.5.  Because  lnV explains  so little 
31n this specification,  unlike  the standard  probit  model,  the error 











FIgure 1:  PredIcted vs. Actual Values  of H/W by  Total Wealth  PercentIle 
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Total Wealth  Percentile (14) 
of moving  behavior,  the constant  term  must  be large  to yield the small 
probability  of moving that the data  exhibit.  Thus the results  from this 
procedure  indicate  that the value associated  with housing  equity,  and the 
wealth  allocation  that it represents,  must  be increased  substantially--about 
50 percent--for  a family  to  move.  Indeed, without a change  in family  status 
or retirement,  the "transaction  costs" of moving  are apparently  prohibitive 
for many families,  the family  is simply  not going  to  move.  This is consistent 
with the  small  moving  probability  in any two year interval,  about .08 on 
average. 
Now consider  the maximum likelihood  estimates  reported  in table 1.  Three 
key parameters  determine  the estimated  transaction  costs:  m0,  estimated  to be 
2.00, o  estimated  at  0.77,  and cx with an estimated  value  of 0.62.  The mean 
of the estimated  values of lnN is 1.56.  Thus the estimates  suggest  a mean 
transaction  costs parameter  of 1.56, with a standard  deviation  in any time 
interval  of 1.39.  For a few, then,  the resistance  to moving  is very small  if 
the estimates  are taken  lUerally;  for many more the resistance  is quite 
large.  On  average,  the value  associated  with the allocation  of total  wealth 
would  have to be increased  by over 50 percent  to induce  the family  to  move. 
Much more important  than a potential  reallocation  of wealth--AlnV-  -in the 
decision  to move are changes  in retirement,  marital,  or health  status.  The 
probability  of moving  in the base case is .075.  If the family  head retires 
9These  estimated  values are sensitive  to errors  in reported  housing 
equity.  If instead  of the median  of the several housing  values reported  by 
each family  in the biannual surveys before  a  move (see the appendix),  the 
actual  recorded  values  are used,  all of these  estimates  are considerably 
larger. 
10With lnV evaluated  at its mean and  with all the dummy  variables 
assumed  to be zero. (15) 
during  the interval,  the probability  is increased  to .122.  If there  is a 
change  in marital  status-  -from  married  to divorced  or from married to widowed 
for example- -the probability  increases  to .l5O)  A much larger  proportion  of 
families  in these  circumstances  have very low transaction  costs,  by our 
definition,  assuming  the same disturbance  variance.  Families  who otherwise 
would find moving  extremely  unattractive  find that it is much less  so at the 
time of these  precipitating  shocks. 
III.  Simulations 
There  are two distinct  questions  about  the desired  reallocation  of wealth 
among  housing equity  and other  assets:  one is the magnitude  of the desired 
changes,  the other is whether they are positive  or negative.  The magnitude  of 
the desired  changes  is shown  in tables  2a and 2b.  The entries  in the tables 
are  the average  (and median)  of  the absolute  values  of the difference  between 
actual  and desired  housing  equity.  For a given  family,  the comparison  is made 
for each survey  year until the family  moves;  thus  a single  family  may 
contribute  several  observations.  Actual  housing  equity  is the value inherited 
from the previous  period.  To predict  desired  housing in table  2a, the 
disturbance  term in the housing equity  equation (10) is not considered;  it is 
assumed  to reflect maximization  error.  The overall  average,  including  both 
movers  and stayers  is $5,377.  It is $9886 for movers,  but only $5,117  for 
stayers.  The medians show comparable  differences,  but the magnitudes  are 
reduced;  the overall  median  is $2,315;  it is $5,159  for movers  and $2,195 
111n fact  divorce  or marriage  are associated  with a much higher 
probability  of  moving,  about  .43.  (See Venti and  Wise [l987). (16) 
Table 2a.  Mean (Median)  of Absolute  Values of Preferred  Minus  Actual Housing 
Equity,  By Move Status and By Housing Equity  nd income  Quartiles, 
Excluding  Disturbance  Term. 
Income  Housing  Equity 
Low  2nd  3rd 
-  4th  Total 
All 
Low  1734  3415  4590  8243  3555 
(660)  (1685)  (2244)  (5384)  (1360) 
2nd  2569  3663  4918  7844  4503 
(1162)  (2176)  (2617)  (4270)  (2187) 
3rd  2888  3742  5155  8285  5054 
(1324)  (2125)  (2806)  (4420)  (2496) 
4th  4052  4317  6409  12394  8396 
(1705)  (2101)  (3367)  (6016)  (3717) 
Total  2435  3737  5343  9980  5377 
(963)  (2020)  (2815)  (4996)  (2315) 
Movers 
Low  3744  8899  8352  11060  7473 
(2233)  (6205)  (7861)  (11272)  (4932) 
2nd  4526  6716  8328  16509  9062 
(2584)  (3598)  (5340)  (9264)  (4865) 
3rd  6883  6156  5707  13064  8099 
(3552)  (3966)  (4243)  (8286)  (4587) 
4th  8635  8247  10829  20069  14211 
(3187)  (6314)  (6008)  (10189)  (7171) 
Total  5699  7432  8257  16407  9886 
(2707)  (4662)  (5337)  (9707)  (5159) 
Stayers 
Low  1658  3147  4413  8038  3372 
(629)  (1624)  (2058)  (4077)  (1265) 
2nd  2445  3523  4717  7128  4224 
(1130)  (2137)  (2456)  (3935)  (2089) 
3rd  2575  3627  5127  7953  4873 
(1206)  (1990)  (2793)  (4175)  (2406) 
4th  3516  4132  6185  11897  8031 
(1535)  (2005)  (3251)  (5801)  (3510) 
Total  2238  3563  5191  9528  5117 
(900)  (1926)  (2729)  (4709)  (2195) (17) 
Table 2b.  Mean (1edian)  of Absolute  Values  of Preferred  Minus  Actual Housing 
Equity, y  (ove Status and y  Housing Equity  and Income  Quartiles, 
Including  Disturbance  Term. 
Income  Housing Equity 
Low  2nd  3rd  4th 
All 
Low  3259  6661  9628  17993  7257 
(1976)  (4715)  (6759)  (12056)  (3774) 
2nd  5078  8019  11131  18391  10039 
(3274)  (5797)  (8251)  (12503)  (6233) 
3rd  5998  9693  13164  20245  12462 
(4066)  (7102)  (9864)  (14606)  (8195) 
9405  12052  17608  30355  21306 
(6132)  (9012)  (12683)  (21384)  (13348) 
Total  4946  8852  13257  23982  12766 
(2915)  (6249)  (9368)  (15937)  (7164) 
1overs 
Low  5395  11430  12065  16727  10546 
(3071)  (7371)  (10255)  (13238)  (6969) 
2nd  7118  9368  14742  26544  14546 
(5107)  (6276)  (11029)  (16448)  (8465) 
3rd  10234  13601  15903  21743  15539 
(6542)  (10102)  (12349)  (16605)  (10621) 
4th  14578  18375  21636  36847  26698 
(7856)  (13333)  (17182)  (23704)  (16643) 
Total  8877  12736  16504  28251  17283 
(5301)  (8264)  (12593)  (17795)  (10242) 
Stayers 
Low  3179  6428  9514  18085  7103 
(1946)  (4629)  (6622)  (11875)  (3694) 
2nd  4948  7958  10918  17718  9763 
(3160)  (5778)  (8159)  (12257)  (6145) 
3rd  5666  9507  13024  20141  12278 
(3906)  (6993)  (9711)  (14481)  (8067) 
4th  8800  11754  17405  29935  20967 
(5834)  (8775)  (12500)  (21243)  (13154) 
Total  4709  8668  13088  23681  12506 
(2824)  (6157)  (9214)  (15828)  (7013) (18) 
stayers.  The difference  apparently  reflects  the fact that, on average, 
families  who move have  more to gain from  wealth  reallocation  than families  who 
don't  move.  That is,  to the extent  that a reallocation  of housing equity  is a 
motivation  for moving,  the difference  should  be greater  for those who have 
chosen  to move than  for those who have not.  As emphasized  above, however, it 
is clear that this is not the major reason  for moving.  The difference 
increases  with  both income and housing  wealth  quartile,  especially  the  latter. 
The mean difference  among movers  with  high incomes  and high  housing equity  is 
$20,069;  the median is $10,189.  Among those  with low income  and low housing 
equity  the mean is only $3,744,  with a median of only $2,233. 
Table  2b is analogous  to table  2a but the disturbance  term in the housing 
equation  is assumed  to reflect  desired  housing  choice,  instead  of a 
maximization  error  or deviation  from the optimal  level.  To incorporate  the 
disturbance  term,  a random  draw is made from the estimated  error 
distribution--normal  with mean  0 and  variance 0.2008•W--each  time that desired 
housing  is predicted.  Although  this does  not affect  the expected  value of 
housing  equity,  since  the expected  value of v is  zero,  it does affect  the 
absolute  values  of the deviation.  This can be seen  by comparing  the values in 
table  2b with those  in table  2a.  For example,  the average  of the absolute 
values  of the desired  change  over all families  is $5,377  when the disturbance 
term  is not accounted  for and $12,766 when it is. 
The values  in tables 2a and 2b indicate  the change  in  housing equity  that 
would occur  if transaction  cost  were  zero.  On average,  the desired  change in 
housing equity  may  be substantial. 
But,  also on average,  the desire  is not to reduce, but rather  to increase 
housing  equity,  as shown  in table  3.  This table  shows  the mean (and median) (19) 
Table  3.  Mean (and Median)  of Preferred  Minus Actual  Housing  Equity,  By Move 
Status  and By Housing Equity  and Income  Quartiles. 
Income Housing Equity 
Low  2nd  3rd  4th  Total 
All 
Low  243  50  285  -1924  -86 
(-29)  (-89)  (0)  (-1008)  (-64) 
2nd  866  814  191  -225  468 
(50)  (275)  (427)  (-511)  (30) 
3rd  1133  897  1323  649  1009 
(71)  (205)  (275)  (269)  (185) 
4th  2497  1923  2438  3940  3007 
(674)  (552)  (819)  (915)  (721) 
Total  827  835  1165  1569  1010 
(24)  (199)  (221)  (151)  (106) 
Movers 
Low  2054  3406  718  -2815  1210 
(1048)  (269)  (-2567)  (-2912)  (357) 
2nd  2812  2647  2655  -833  1775 
(906)  (364)  (-524)  (-3840)  (37) 
3rd  4834  2586  2976  -1566  2127 
(2041)  (794)  (1754)  (-1487)  (810) 
4th  7625  5328  4310  9337  7326 
(2627)  (4868)  (1194)  (4405)  (3109) 
Total  4044  3321  2877  2822  3258 
(1324)  (704)  (930)  (-795)  (854) 
Stayers 
Low  176  -114  264  -1860  -147 
(-39)  (-94)  (2)  (-939)  (-67) 
2nd  743  731  46  -175  388 
(26)  (275)  (-126)  (-439)  (30) 
3rd  843  817  1238  803  943 
(50)  (183)  (230)  (338)  (176) 
4th  1897  1762  2343  3590  2736 
(450)  (479)  (801)  (770)  (619) 
Total  633  718  1076  1481  975 
(5)  (176)  (207)  (185)  (89) (20) 
difference  between desired  and existing  housing  equity,  again  by housing 
equity  and income,  and for movers  and for stayers.  This table  indicates  the 
housing choices that  families  would  make were there  no moving transaction 
costs  and all families  chose  housing equity  to optimize  the allocation  of 
wealth  between  housing and other assets.  The average  difference  is $1,010  and 
the median difference  is $106.  Families  with low income  and high housing 
wealth  would like to reduce  housing equity, but those with high income  and low 
housing equity  would like to allocate  more wealth to housing. 
The predicted  mean increase  for movers  is $3,258;  the median is $854. 
Like the predictions  for all households  together,  those  for movers show some 
reallocations  that increase  housing  equity  and others  that reduce  it.  On 
average,  the  increases  outweigh  the reductions.  The results  in the second 
panel of the table  are  very similar  in pattern to the findings  reported in 
Venti  and Wise [1987], although  the magnitudes  are smaller  herej2  The mean 
predicted  change  in  the housing equity of  stayers,  were they to move,  is $975, 
with a median  of $89.  Comparison  of the panels  for movers  and for stayers 
shows  that the predicted  changes within the cells are typically  greater  for 
movers  than for stayers. 
The average of predicted  percentage  differences  between  actual  and 
desired  housing  equity  are shown in table 4.  Two features  of the table  stand 
12The  earlier  results  were actual  changes  in  housing equity  among  movers 
by housing equity  and income  quartile,  after controlling  for age,  calendar 
year,  children,  and changes  in  retirement,  health,  or marital  status.  A 
correction  was also  made for reporting  errors.  The predictions  here may 
provide  more accurate  information  because the continuous  functional  form  does 
not allow  measurement  error-  -which  would  be most  prevalent  among  families  who 
enter  the upper right  and the lower  left  portions  of the table--to  exert as 
large  a force  ott the results  as the thunmy variable  specification  used in our 
earlier  paper.  It could  also  be that the specification  used  here does not fit 
the data as well as flexible  form  used there. (21) 
Table  4.  Mean (and  Median)  Percent  Difference  Between  Actual  and Preferred 
Housing  Equity,  By Move Status and by Housing Equity  and Income  Quartiles. 
Income  Housing  Equity 
4th  Tota].  Low  2nd  3rd 
Low  3.4  0.3  0.9  -3.3  1.3 
(-0.4)  (-0.5)  (0.0)  (-1.9)  (-0.5) 
2nd  10.4  4.1  0.7  0.0  4.2 
(0.5)  (1.3)  (-0.4)  (-1.0)  (0.2) 
3rd  10.9  4.3  4.1  1.3  4.8 
(0.8)  (0.9)  (0.9)  (0.5)  (0.8) 
24.9  8.8  7.5  7.0  9.4 
(5.9)  (2.5)  (2.6)  (1.5)  (2.2) 
Total  9.1  4.0  3.6  2.9  4.9 
(0.3)  (0.9)  (0.7)  (0.3)  (0.6) 
Movers 
28.2  17,9  2.2  -3.5  14.3 
(18.2)  (1.2)  (-7.2)  (-6.9)  (2.2) 
2nd  47.2  14.4  8.3  1.1  18.9 
(13.5)  (1.8)  (-1.7)  (-8.7)  (0.2) 
3rd  44.3  12.4  9.1  -0.7  16.1 
(17.6)  (3.7)  (5.4)  (-3.6)  (2.8) 
4th  71.9  26.9  12.0  18.7  28.2 
(35.5)  (23.0)  (3.8)  (8.0)  (11.1) 
Total  46.2  17.0  8.5  7.2  19.7 
(18.8)  (3.4)  (2.8)  (-1.4)  (3.8) 
Stayers 
Low  2.5  -0.5  0.8  -3.3  0.7 
(-0.5)  (-0.5)  (0.0)  (-1.8)  (-06) 
2nd  8.1  3.6  0.3  -0.1  3.3 
(0.3)  (1.3)  (-0.3)  (-08)  (0.1) 
3rd  8.3  3.9  3.8  1.5  4.2 
(0.5)  (0.9)  (0.7)  (0.6)  (0.8) 
4th  19.4  8.0  7.3  6.2  8.2 
(4.3)  (2.2)  (2.5)  (1.3)  (2.0) 
Total  6.8  3.4  3.4  2.6  4.1 
(01)  (0.9)  (07)  (0.4)  (0.5) (22) 
out.  The desired changes  are positive  on average  and are greater  for movers 
than for stayers.  And,  the desired  increases  are much greater  for families 
with high income  and low housing  wealth  than for families  with low income  and 
high housing  equity.  This pattern  is especially  evident among  movers.  On 
average  movers  with high income  and low  housing equity  would like to increase 
housing equity  by 72 percent;  the average  mover with low income  and high 
housing  equity  would like to reduce housing equity  by only 3.5 percent.  Were 
there no moving  transaction  costs, and all  families  moved to optimize  the 
allocation  of wealth  between housing  and other  assets,  housing equity  would 
increase  by 4.9 percent  on average;  the typical  family  would  not change 
housing  equity,  as indicated  by the median  percent change  of 0.6 percent. 
IV.  Stmrnary  and Conclusions 
Mobility  among  elderly  families  is very low.  Approximately  8 percent of 
RHS homeowners  move during  a two-year  period.  The percent increases  very 
substantially,  to about  15 percent,  at the time of precipitating  shocks like 
change  in marital status  or  retirement.  Thus most elderly  are apparently 
reluctant  to move.  In our analysis  this is reflected  in  large  transaction 
costs  of moving.  The analysis  emphasizes  the potential  gain in utility to be 
had by moving and the resulting  opportunity  to reallocate  wealth  between 
housing  and other assets,  under  the presumption  that  many elderly  would like 
to withdraw  wealth  from  housing to finance current  consumption  of other types. 
This  potential  gain is very small,  however,  for most elderly.  Thus relative 
to the potential  gain from a reallocation  of  wealth,  the transaction  costs  of 
moving  are large. (23) 
Nonetheless,  the transaction  costs  evidently  have very little  affect  on 
the housing equity  of the elderly.  The evidence  suggests  that although  some 
elderly  would  make substantial  changes  in housing equity  were they to choose. 
new housing, some would choose  to add to housing  wealth  and others  to reduce 
it.  On balance,  were all elderly  to move and choose  optimal levels  of housing 
equity,  the amount  of  housing equity would  be increased  slightly.  Thus the 
results reinforce  our earlier  findings,  and those  of Feinstein  and McFadden 
[1988).  Most elderly  are not liquidity  constrained.  And contrary  to standard 
formulations  of the life cycle  hypothesis,  the typical  elderly family  has no 
desire  to reduce  housing equity.  This is true even  among families  with low 
total wealth,  for whom housing equity  is a large  fraction  of total wealth. 
The desired  reduction  of housing  equity  is largest among families  with low 
income and high  housing  wealth,  but even in this  case the desired reductions 
are rather  small.  And these  desired  reductions  are more than  offset  by the 
desired  increases  of other families,  especially  those with high income and low 
housing  wealth. 
The evidence  of high moving  transaction  costs, however, suggests  that 
some families  may be prevented  by such  costs  from  moving,  even though  they 
would like  to reduce  housing  equity.  It is for these families  that reverse 
annuity  mortgages  would  apparently  be most  beneficial.  Limited  demand, 
though,  may explain  the absence  of an  active market  for such financial 
instruments. (24) 
Apyendix:  Selection  of estimation  sample  and  variable definitions. 
The estimates  are based on data from  the Retirement  History Survey (RHS). 
The survey  covered  families  headed  by persons  between ages 58 and 63 in 1969. 
The families  were interviewed  every two years  between 1969 and 1979;  there 
were six waves altogether.  The initial  sample  contained  slightly  over 11,000 
families.  Over 8000 families  were interviewed  in the last survey  in 1979. 
To obtain the sample  for this paper  we began with all families  who owned 
homes in  1969.  A family  was omitted  from the sample  if the first move was  to 
a rental  unit,  or if data  used in the analysis  (other  than  housing wealth) 
were missing in any year prior to the first  move.  The remaining  sample 
consisted  of 4106 families.  In  addition,  housing equity  was  sometimes  missing 
or  rnisreported.  In some cases housing equity  was not reported  in  one or more 
years;  in other  cases  it was apparently  either  incorrectly  reported  or 
incorrectly  coded  in one or more  years.  This latter  problem  is clearly 
evident  in the tremendous  year to year  variation in housing  equity.  In our 
model  a large  error  in reported  housing  equity  for a family  that doesn't  move 
in a given interval  means that  the  family must be dropped from  the sample. 
This is because a family,  at each  point in  time,  must choose  between  its 
current  level  of housing equity (inherited  from the previous  period)  and the 
optimal  allocation  of housing  wealth.  If housing equity  is incorrectly 
reported  to be unusually  high in period  t,  then in some cases  housing  equity 
in period t will exceed  total wealth  in period  ti-l.  Unless  nonhousing  wealth 
is negative  or housing values  dropped sharply  between  periods  t and t+l,  such 
cases  reflect  error in year to year  reported  housing  equity.  Instead  of 
deleting  all such  cases from the sample,  the median of housing equity  (in 1.979 
dollars)  over all periods  prior to a move is used as the measure of housing (25) 
equity in each period  rhat the family  does  not move.  If a family  moves, the 
median represents  the equity  of the old unit;  the equity  of the new unit is 
the reported  amount.  The  final sample  includes  3423 families. 
Initial  estimates  were obtained  using reported  housing  equity throughout. 
This  meant that  a disproportionate  number  of families  with low housing equity 
and low total  wealth  were deleted from  the sample.  In fact,  the central 
conclusions  of the paper are not affected  by the sample  selection  procedure, 
although  individual  estimates  are. 
The definitions  of most of the variables  are straightforward. Housing 
equity is the market  value of  the house  less mortgage  and other  debt on the 
house.  Nonhousing  wealth  includes  real property (less debt), motor  vehicles 
(less debt),  savings  bonds,  corporate  stocks  and bonds,  checking  accounts, 
savings  accounts,  and the face value  of life insurance.  Total  wealth is the 
sum of housing and nonhousing  wealth.  The changes in  health,  retirement,  and 
family  status  pertain to the two-year  intervals  between  surveys. (26) 
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